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A defence industry strategist argues India must treat the electromagnetic spectrum as a warfighting domain and reform its dual-use technology licensing framework to stay competitive.
✦ AI SUMMARY 30-second read
- India's spectrum policy remains primarily telecom-focused, leaving gaps in civil-military coordination when drone or electronic warfare threats emerge near sensitive installations.
- Legal authority to jam or neutralise hostile drones is restricted to a small number of agencies, leaving airports, power plants and police forces able to detect threats but unable to act on them.
- Unpredictable dual-use export licensing is said to deter defence R&D investment and push testing abroad, weakening the industrial base the armed forces will rely on in a crisis.
Why it matters: Spectrum dominance has become a core warfighting domain globally, and policy gaps could leave India's defence and critical infrastructure exposed.
This summary was generated by AI. Editors may review and update it.
India's approach to spectrum management and dual-use technology exports is drawing scrutiny from within the defence industry, with a call for a national spectrum security framework and faster, more predictable licensing for products that serve both civilian and military markets.
Wing Commander Harikumar, an Indian Air Force veteran with 22 years of experience in radar systems and aircraft maintenance who retired in 2018 and now serves as President – International Business at BBBS Pvt Ltd, has set out a case for treating the electromagnetic spectrum as a strategic domain rather than a commercial utility.
The argument draws on recent conflict experience, including persistent jamming and spoofing of drone and navigation signals in Ukraine and repeated GNSS interference affecting civil aviation over the Baltic and parts of West Asia. Indian operators have reported similar positioning anomalies, prompting guidance from the country's aviation regulator.
The coordination and legal gaps
The analysis identifies three practical problems with the current framework. The first is coordination: when an unidentified drone appears over a sensitive installation, no single body has clear authority to decide which agency acts, on which frequencies, and under what legal basis, leading to case-by-case decisions and lost time.
The second concerns legal clarity. Jammer use in India is restricted to a limited set of authorised agencies, yet airport operators, refineries, power plants, prisons and police forces are among those most exposed to drone threats. These entities can procure detection equipment but have no defined authority to act on what they detect. As the analysis puts it, detection without the ability to respond is only half a solution.
The third problem is testing access. Developing electronic warfare equipment such as jammers, direction finders or resilient military radios requires transmitting on real frequencies under controlled conditions. Limited access to test ranges and temporary spectrum permissions slows product development and, in some cases, pushes testing outside India.
The dual-use licensing challenge
Software-defined radios, RF components, AI-based signal analysis and satellite communication technologies all serve both civilian and military markets, placing them under dual-use export controls. India joined the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017 alongside the MTCR and Australia Group, and its SCOMET list aligns national controls with these international regimes.
The argument is not that the rules are wrong, but that uncertainty around them is costly. Companies often cannot quickly determine whether a product requires a licence, which category it falls under, or how long approval will take. Customers in the Middle East, Africa, South-East Asia and Central Asia frequently have access to suppliers from countries with faster-moving export systems, meaning delays can determine whether a contract is won or lost.
There is also a domestic consequence. When the export path is slow and unpredictable, investors perceive a smaller addressable market and companies reduce commitment to dual-use research and development, gradually eroding the industrial base the armed forces would depend on during a crisis.
What the proposed framework would involve
Five broad steps are proposed. A national spectrum security framework with a standing civil-military body would coordinate allocations, respond to interference and set emergency priorities. Defined legal powers and standard procedures would allow police and critical infrastructure operators to detect, jam or neutralise hostile drones within a clear accountability structure.
Designated test frequencies, test locations and fast-track permissions would allow Indian companies to develop and validate electronic warfare and RF products domestically. On licensing, the proposals include early product classification, time-bound decisions and wider use of general authorisations for trusted partner countries.
On the supply-chain side, the analysis notes that RF chips, radio platforms, antennas and signal processing hardware remain heavily import-dependent, and that no policy document alone can address that vulnerability. Sustained investment in indigenous capability is described as the only remedy.
What happens next
The piece does not report any government decision or legislative proposal; it is a policy argument directed at regulators and industry stakeholders. Whether the proposals gain traction with bodies responsible for spectrum management, counter-drone regulation or export licensing remains to be seen.
Elets will update this story as related policy developments emerge.